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NUCLEAR STABILITY AT LOW NUMBERS
The Perspective from Beijing
Christopher P. Twomey
Chinese writings on the workings of nuclear stability, deterrence, and coercion are thin and
politicized. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean, from direct and inferential evidence, rather
pessimistic conclusions regarding Chinese views of nuclear stability at low numbers. While China
has been living with low numbers in its own arsenal for decades, today it views missile defense
and advanced conventional weapons as the primary threat to nuclear stability. More generally,
China views nuclear stability as wedded to political amity. Because none of these would be directly
addressed through further US and Russian arsenal reductions, China is unlikely to view such
reductions as particularly stabilizing. While there is little in Chinese writing to suggest lower US
and Russian numbers would encourage a ‘‘race to parity,’’ there are grounds to worry about China
becoming more assertive as it gains confidence in Beijing’s own increasingly secure second-strike
forces.
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This article investigates Chinese perceptions regarding a future world characterized by
substantial reductions in global nuclear arsenals. There is not much direct, concrete
evidence on this point in China. Instead, polemics dominate relevant Chinese discussions.
Given arsenal disparities, there is no pressure in China to consider this, and censorship
precludes much discussion on this sensitive topic. Indeed, there is limited discussion of the
sources of stability beyond those that are compliant with Chinese declaratory policy.
However, what we can discern about Chinese understandings of stability suggests
that several non-nuclear impediments to confidence regarding the current situation exist.
These are not directly related to arsenal sizes. Thus, ‘‘lower’’ numbers will not necessarily
improve those concerns for Beijing. This will complicate the stated US goal of reducing its
arsenal and its reliance on nuclear weapons by raising security dilemma concerns: China
will not be reassured by the reductions of others, and so will take steps to ensure its own
security.
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that ‘‘low nuclear numbers’’ are
already a reality for China. The relevant questions then are—for a world in which China
may have to commit to continuing to live with such low numbers—how would greatly
reduced US numbers improve China’s security? This article concludes, on the basis of
written work and inference from Chinese debates, that such reductions would not have
much influence. The effect of lower Russian numbers is even more challenging to assess,
although there are some modest signs of increased threat perceptions regarding Russia
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that further reductions might ameliorate.1 That said, Beijing may perceive some increased
freedom of action as lower US numbers complicate its extended deterrence commitments
in the region.2 However, there is little in Chinese writings to suggest Beijing views a ‘‘sprint
to parity’’ as a useful goal that it might pursue were the US to draw down.3
This article first outlines the structure of the situation in which China currently finds
itself, as a way to highlight the reasons for the limited discussions on this topic. Thus, both
China’s current, limited arsenal and its perspective on global arms control are briefly
discussed. Next, it describes how China understands strategic stability today, with an eye
toward how that maps to a future world of ‘‘lower numbers.’’ Thereafter, contemporary
Chinese concerns with non-nuclear—yet ‘‘strategic’’—elements in nuclear affairs are
highlighted, to illustrate the multidimensionality of the problem. An intellectual excursion
to consider views in Beijing about other ‘‘low numbers dyads’’ (in South Asia) only
reinforces the pervasiveness of these concerns. The article concludes by offering a few
implications with regard to the future sizing of China’s arsenal and its consequences for US
extended deterrence commitments.
Reasons for Limited Engagement with ‘‘Low Numbers’’ Questions in China
There is only limited information about China’s perspective on this topic for several
reasons that merit examination. First, it is inarguably the case that China has long had ‘‘low
numbers.’’ As such, it is the existing state of China’s posture, not a hypothetical future to
be analyzed and considered by Chinese analysts. Beyond that, there has traditionally been
pessimism regarding the likelihood of other states substantially reducing their nuclear
arsenals, so a detailed examination of a world of low numbers has not occurred. Only
recently are there some signs that this pessimism may be changing.
China is Already Living With Low Numbers
If we are asking questions about the implications of ‘‘low nuclear numbers,’’ we need to
have a clear understanding of the baseline, including arsenal disparity. Other articles in this
special section have done this for the ‘‘big two’’ arsenals of the United States and Russia.4
For the Chinese arsenal, it is critical to base any analysis on a recognition that Beijing has
been ‘‘living with low nuclear numbers’’ since it first deployed such weapons in 1964. Of
China’s approximately 240 warheads—of which about 175 are operational—only a
handful can be targeted against the United States.5 According to the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), ‘‘China’s strategic missile force, the Second Artillery, currently has fewer than
50 [intercontinental ballistic missiles, or] ICBMs that can strike the continental United
States.’’6 Although there is no particular consensus on the precise definition of ‘‘low
numbers,’’ surely this is close.7
There has been much discussion in the United States about the prospect that China
has developed a significantly larger arsenal hidden inside a large and dispersed set of
underground tunnels. These assertions regarding arsenal size have been thoroughly
debunked by a wide variety of sources (including the aforementioned testimony of DIA
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directors), although the Chinese use of tunnels is (and long has been) widely accepted.8
Chinese opacity complicates precise estimation of its arsenal size, but nuclear physics has
limited the stockpile of fissile material from which Beijing can build warheads.
This force is, however, rapidly modernizing in several dimensions. There will clearly
be quantitative increases in the future; the DIA assessment cited above forecasts a
doubling in ICBM delivery capabilities, plus an increase of ballistic missile submarines over
the next decade.9 China’s ICBMs are increasingly survivable, based on mobile launch
platforms and incorporating solid fuel.10 The Second Artillery is increasing the quality of its
training and preparation, including such improvements as:
. fighting under conditions of ‘‘informationalization’’ (i.e., recognizing US advances
in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and command and control;
. complex electromagnetic environments (recognizing the dangers of jamming
and compromised communications systems); and
. using an opposition ‘‘blue force’’ in training (rather than a scripted opponent).11
Beyond that, ‘‘China may also be modernizing its medium-range and short-range missile
systems, with an eye to deterring a nuclear threat from within its range, such as from the
Asia-Pacific region.’’12
All of this occurs under the rubric of China’s averred ‘‘defensive’’ strategy. China
claims its weapons are solely for the purpose of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by
others. Its declaratory ‘‘no first use’’ (NFU) policy has long been central to this.13 That said,
there are opaque hints that some doctrinal change may be underway. For instance, there
are some signs of discussions regarding wartime deterrence and the importance of ‘‘rapid
response’’ that did not previously appear in Chinese strategic writings.14
Nevertheless, even considering these changes, China only has ‘‘low numbers’’ today.
China maintains a small fraction of the ‘‘big two’s’’ capabilities when compared to the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty’s (or New START) totals of 1,550 deployed warheads and
800 launch systems. However, how reassuring would further cuts in US-Russian arsenals be
for China? While further deep cuts are not inevitable, for domestic reasons and other
factors that have nothing to do with China (as pointed out by David Yost in this issue), it is
highly likely that the ‘‘big two’’ would treat some Chinese commitments as a prerequisite
to any further reductions of their own. Thus, it is important to understand the conditions
that shape Chinese perceptions toward this outcome as well as possible behaviors Beijing
might assume.
Chinese Traditional Pessimism of Global Disarmament Trends
Beyond the above points, China has not deeply examined what a ‘‘world with low nuclear
numbers’’ might look like because of Beijing’s traditional pessimism regarding the state of
global arms control. This is only now starting to change.
While welcoming the rhetoric that underlies the Barack Obama administration’s
aspiration for eventual nuclear abolition, many Chinese remain skeptical.15 Some official
partymouthpieces are dismissive of recent cuts in US (and Russian) arsenals.16 There is a deep
suspicion regarding New START and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), even among
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some civilian analysts knowledgeable of the United States.17 (Indeed, using New START
counting rules, China’s arsenal is zero weapons.) This suspicion extends to Russia as well.18
Still, there are other views that are less critical, and there appears to be some
tenuous recognition of change afoot, and a less instinctual rejection of such change than
in the past.19 For instance:
The current international situation is evolving at an accelerated pace, the situation in the
field of arms control is moving forward rapidly, and China’s position and role is also
undergoing profound changes. We need to be equipped with the spirit of advancing
with the times, master the new situation and grasp new problems, strengthen theoretical
study of arms control, actively enrich, perfect, and develop related policies and strategies,
and continue to expand our participation and contribution to the international arms
control progress.20
A few other Chinese analysts offer a positive assessment of a Chinese role and
responsibilities in broader, global nonproliferation and arms reductions.21
Still, these emerging, more optimistic voices are in the distinct minority. The
predominant view that global arms control has yet to be meaningful precludes detailed
discussion in Beijing of what further progress in this regard might imply for China. Until
there is more political space for genuine and political debate on these topics, we will have
to infer Chinese views on the topic. The following sections attempt to do so, beginning
with an examination of Chinese views on strategic stability today.
Chinese Conceptions of Strategic Stability
In order to understand Chinese views about a world of low numbers, it is helpful to
understand how China views strategic affairs more generally. Chinese analysts today
emphasize that stability in strategic nuclear affairs comes about primarily from a broader
political stability between nations, but also through declaratory policy. The latter centers
on ‘‘no first use’’ (NFU) declarations, but also includes other indicators of intentions
regarding the use of such weapons.
Strategic Stability Comes From Political Comity
At the most basic level, a wide range of Chinese analysts and military officials
emphasize that nuclear stability is a function of the broader tenor of the US-China
relationship.22 For instance, they often express the belief that the road toward a world
without nuclear weapons will inevitably require a mutual change in ways of thinking
and the gradual irrelevance of nuclear deterrence theory.23 This concept of a
convergence of viewpoints, of a mutuality of perceptions, is common. Many also
emphasize the necessity of adopting basic principles acceptable to both sides before
engaging in any nuclear reduction discussions: mutual respect, enhancing mutual trust,
understanding and respecting each other’s core interests and major security concerns,
working to expand the intersection of US-Chinese security interests, and guaranteeing
the development of US-Chinese strategic stability.24
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To some, this long-emphasized point resonates with a more holistic view of the
world that Chinese strategic culture purportedly takes. In any event, it is certainly the case
that most of this author’s discussions with Chinese interlocutors must begin with a
discussion about broader strategic intentions before turning to narrower tactical,
operational, or dynamic effects. This approach has traditionally impeded discussions
between the two sides, given that there is a range of issues (starting with, but extending
beyond, Taiwan) that are contested by the two sides.
Even some moderating views on the bilateral strategic dynamic do not necessarily
lead to ‘‘genuine’’ strategic stability. Thus, there have been few signs in the past two or
three years of a moderation in Chinese views of the United States as an implacable
strategic rival. The 2010 NPR is central in this (possible) reassessment. For instance:
According to PLA [People’s Liberation Army] nuclear strategist Zhang Tuosheng, US
acceptance of mutual deterrence with China represents the most significant develop-
ment in US nuclear policy. As Zhang emphasizes, this new position by the Obama
government ‘represents a recognition and acceptance of China’s nuclear power. It
reflects the reality of China’s elevated nuclear status.’ He argues that US acceptance of
mutual deterrence ‘means that the probability of a Sino-US nuclear conflict has been
reduced, while the probability of the two sides resolving differences through dialogues
has increased.’25
Tom Fingar, former deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, and a forty-year
China watcher, also notes that the NPR has moderated over time in ways that, from China’s
perspective, highlight some important progress.26
That said, Chinese interlocutors make clear these views on the narrow ‘‘strategic
dynamic’’ do not outweigh the other sources of tension, such as North Korea, Taiwan, and
various island disputes, and so they continue to call for improving those broader political
relations as a key determinant of true strategic stability.
No-First-Use
Beyond general relations, Chinese diplomats, media commentators, military officers, and
researchers frequently call for other states to similarly proclaim, as China repeatedly has, a
policy of no first use (NFU) as a path toward stability. ‘‘For Beijing, the first and most
important bold step toward nuclear disarmament would be a global agreement on no-
first-use of nuclear weapons, which China has advocated ever since it became a nuclear-
weapons state.’’27 This is viewed as something of a cure-all. If all sides had NFUs, the
argument goes, then there would be little risk of nuclear conflict. Obviously, this ignores
the US experience with insincere Soviet declarations of NFU in the later stages of the Cold
War, but it is a common argument by China.28
Other Indicators of Intensions
Some Chinese discussions go beyond these points to evaluate the dangers posed by
nuclear weapons in specific contexts. Three factors are highlighted. First, the more nuclear
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weapons are incorporated into operational war planning, the less stable a nuclear
situation might be. This was most prominently a complaint regarding US policy in the
wake of leaked portions of the 2001 NPR, and at times it continues to be raised today.
Second, nuclear weapons are destabilizing when used for ‘‘coercion.’’ This is noted by two
well-connected Chinese nuclear strategy analysts:
But the Korean, Vietnam and Afghan wars all demonstrate that this prediction does not
reflect actual conditions in international society. The theory of the nuclear taboo in
constructivist theory postulates a norm in international society against the use of nuclear
weapons, a norm known as the nuclear taboo … However, the existence of the
nuclear taboo does not prevent a nuclear weapon state from using the superiority of its
nuclear weapons to engage in coercion. Consequently, the most direct result of a
strategic imbalance is nuclear coercion.29
China has a history of being subject to nuclear coercive threats, so it is highly attuned
to this particular facet of nuclear dynamics.30 From Beijing’s perspective, states should
promise to stop coercing (and create declaratory policy committing to such, i.e., an NFU)
to increase stability.31
Finally, arsenal sizes are occasionally raised in this regard.32 This is a lesser theme,
and one that has diminished in importance somewhat as the US and Russian arsenals have
declined.
It is notable that, with slight exceptions, none of these aforementioned sources of
Chinese strategic stability are materially affected by a reduction in numbers of nuclear
warheads. NFU declarations can exist at low numbers (such as India’s today) or,
theoretically, at high numbers (as offered, however falsely, by the Soviet Union in the
1980s). Adversarial intent is somewhat more complex, and there is an endogenous
relationship between arsenal sizes and intersubjective affinity. Still, at relatively low levels
of nuclear warheads, the Pakistan-India rivalry is plenty intense. Such weapons can be
integrated in operational planning or used for coercion at many levels. Overall, large
reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons by other powers are unlikely to lead, ipso facto,
to an increased sense of strategic stability for China, nor will they, in turn, prompt
reductions in the Chinese arsenal size.
The next section deepens this pessimism, raising additional Chinese ‘‘strategic’’
concerns that transcend those that could be directly affected by low numbers.
Chinese Conceptions of Bilateral Strategic Stability beyond Nuclear Weapons
Reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons, even if unilateral by the United States (or the
‘‘big two’’), are likely to have only limited effects on assuaging Chinese concerns because
of deep threat perceptions surrounding missile defense, advances in conventional
weapons, and space systems. As a definitive statement of Chinese policy assessment
notes, ‘‘Deployment of weapons in outer space or development of global ballistic missile
defence systems and cooperation in this field is neither conducive to maintaining
international strategic stability, nor beneficial to international arms control and non-
proliferation efforts.’’33 To some extent, this may be indicative of China viewing the
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nuclear environment through a broader lens of political relations between states, as
discussed in the previous section.
Missile Defenses
The Chinese Defense White Paper quite strongly makes the case that missile defenses are
destabilizing: ‘‘[T]he global missile defense program will be detrimental to strategic
balance and stability, undermine international and regional security, and have a negative
impact on the process of nuclear disarmament.’’34 Chinese weaponeers and scientists
expand on these concerns, providing insight into the analytic basis for Chinese concerns:
Wang [Wenchao], credited with being the chief designer of China’s sea-based strategic
missiles, expressed grave pessimism about China’s offensive nuclear capability against US
missile defense. He said, ‘‘I have done research: Facing a multi-tiered missile defense
system, if any single layer can achieve a success rate of 70%, then 100 single warhead
missiles could all be intercepted even if they are mounting a simultaneous attack.’’35
Li Bin, a civilian scientist formerly affiliated with the nuclear weapon complex in China,
reminds us that Chinese strategic analysts must make worst-case assumptions (as must US
defense planners):
China probably can’t mitigate this by slightly increasing the number of its offensive
nuclear weapons. The reason is that given the large comparative advantage in numbers
of US missile [sic] compared to China’s, the increase in the number of Chinese nuclear
missiles would likely be used to absorb a US first strike, and only the surviving few could
be used to break through missile defenses.36
Many highlight the ship-based SM-3 anti-missile system as a particular concern.37
A world of low numbers has only limited implications for some of China’s responses
to these threats. For example, traditional penetration aids—e.g. chaff, decoys, etc.—can be
deployed regardless of the limitations on arsenal size.38 As the missile designer cited
above, Wang Wenchao, notes, ‘‘[W]ithout the aid of penetration technologies and stealth
measures, missiles will not be able to survive, let alone hit their targets. Penetration
technologies primarily refer to multiple and independently targeted warheads.’’39 (Emphasis
added.)
Others also emphasize that quantitative buildups will be necessary to deal with US
missile defense systems.
China has to re-think its balancing with other nuclear powers, in terms of the strategic
equilibrium between defence and offence. Beijing has no interest in substantially
expanding its strategic counter-strike capability, but given the development of the US
missile defence systems and China’s ‘minimum’ deterrence posture, Beijing could be
forced to maintain the effectiveness of its strategic deterrence through a mix of
countermeasures such as use of MRV/MIRV (multiple re-entry vehicle/multiple indepen-
dently targetable re-entry vehicle), use of decoys, use of manoeuvarable trajectory in the
re-entry phase.40
Thus, from a Chinese perspective, a significant barrier to any Chinese reduction in numbers
would be the continued US deployment of missile defense systems, whether theater or
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national in nature.41 Indeed, continued deployment of such systems will minimize any
Chinese perceptions of increased security that might otherwise accompany a reduction in
US forces.
Interestingly, Chinese views on the role of missile defenses and stability may change
in coming years. China has begun to develop its own defensive system, and its military
leaders are grasping for strategic concepts to guide its use.42 In January 2010, China
succeeded in its first ground-based, mid-course ballistic missile interception, becoming, as
noted in the Global Times, only ‘‘the second country in the world to conduct this kind of
missile defense test.’’43 There are some signs that a potential stabilizing role for Chinese
missile defenses might manifest in the Sino-Indian context. One military Chinese analyst,
Zhang Zhaozhong, a professor with the PLA National Defense University, argued that ‘‘for
the sake of regional stability, China should continue to develop defense systems against
ballistic missile threats.’’44 There is limited discussion along these lines, but that may
change as Chinese missile defense capabilities expand.
Advanced Conventional Weapons
Beyond fearing missile defenses capable of countering a reduced Chinese retaliatory strike,
Beijing views US advanced conventional capabilities with much trepidation: "[T]he United
States can still rely on other deterrent facilities to assure its security and strategic interests,
and get ahead of other countries.’’45 China has observed US conduct in the initial stages of
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya quite closely, and has a deep awareness of the potency of
precision-guided munitions coupled with advanced ISR capabilities.46
Thus, some in Beijing see US moves to push the global disarmament movement as a
way for the United States to solidify its dominance in conventional weaponry:
First, promoting and building a nuclear-free world can help the United States better
display the advantages of its conventional forces .… The great deterrence effect of the
far superior conventional forces of the United States to medium and small countries is
thus nothing short of nuclear deterrence.47
In particular, such systems are viewed as a threat to China: ‘‘Given the US ability to attack
hard targets, how many of China’s intercontinental missiles could survive a first strike and
then manage to penetrate American missile defense systems? This obviously is an
important issue for the Chinese strategic community to consider.’’48 One scientist
highlights a number of necessary Chinese responses, including increasing concealment
and camouflage and altering force alert levels.49 China’s land-based force and its emerging
submarine force are considered to be increasingly at risk.50 China sees space weapons
helping not only missile defense capabilities, but also as central to improving US advanced
conventional weapons capabilities.51 Lieutenant Colonel Lu Yin of the National Defense
University writes, ‘‘[T]he development of US outer space radar has reduced China’s ability
to hide its nuclear weapons, destroying the survivability and flexibility of Chinese strategic
weapons.’’52
Thus, given that Chinese threat perceptions in the strategic arena have sources
other than high numbers of US nuclear weapons, these are not likely to be materially
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assuaged by US (or US and Russian) reductions, nor are such reductions likely to entice
Chinese reductions themselves. Doing that, it appears, will require both low numbers and
credible restrictions on these other systems. Indeed, it seems probable that, in the context
of continued US conventional dominance, Chinese leaders will continue to view
reductions in the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal as destabilizing.
Inferences From Chinese Views of South Asia’s Low Numbers?
As a final analytic digression, it might be worth recognizing that the points made above
have a certain self-serving, politicized nature for Beijing. Thus, we might look for
alternative discussions of strategic stability by Chinese analysts to see whether they
confirm such threat perceptions and the attendant implications for stability at low
numbers.
In particular, if the US-China relationship is too fraught to yield any non-politicized
analysis, perhaps Chinese views of the South Asian situation might be more useful.
Unfortunately, the little available evidence suggests a modest degree of conformity with
the above pessimism.
There is, to be sure, some suggestion that even low numbers of nuclear weapons
have stabilized the subcontinent. Before going on to note other influences in restraining
conflict, two scholars wrote, ‘‘It is true that nuclear weapons played an important role in
restraining India and Pakistan from taking radical action.’’53 Similarly, Han Hua, an expert
on South Asia and arms control at the premier Beijing University, sees nuclear stability as
improving over time as Pakistani strategic awareness deepens. She has some optimism
that nuclear deterrence, at least eventually, reduces prospect for inadvertent escalation
and indeed, lower level conflict.54 Finally, one PLA-affiliated researcher stated, ‘‘Although
nuclear weapons act as an effective deterrent to a possible large-scale confrontation
between the two, the issue of the safety and stability of the South Asia region is also
greatly affected.’’55 To be sure, such points suggest a degree of optimism in China that low
levels of nuclear weapons are conducive to nuclear stability, as one might expect from
traditional Chinese force posture.
However, alongside those assessments are ‘‘outside circumstances’’ that are
generally invoked to explain the stability that exists in South Asia. Many Chinese analysts
argue that it is the role of the United States in controlling crises—and India in particular—
that has led to stability.56
More worryingly, many highlight exactly the sort of concerns that underlie the
pessimism in the previous section. Han Hua warns that South Asian strategic stability does
not ‘‘merely rest in India’s one-sided ‘restraint’,’’ but rather requires avoiding low intensity
conflict, for which US pressure and intervention is needed. She notes that although the
terrorist attacks in Mumbai on November 29, 2008, happened after India adopted the
more provocative ‘‘Cold Start’’ army doctrine, ‘‘New Delhi did not implement the
doctrine by launching a quick counterattack inside Pakistan right after the attacks;
instead, it induced the US to put pressure on Pakistan.’’57 Regarding missile defense, she
writes that:
SPECIAL SECTION: THE PERSPECTIVE FROM BEIJING 297
Missile defense capability is destabilizing at this stage when they [South Asian nations]
are building their credible and minimum nuclear deterrence. Second, fast expansion of
conventional capability by one country, compatible with its more provocative army
doctrine, could compel the conventionally weaker state [to feel it has] no other option
but to lower the nuclear threshold during a crisis; and lastly, fast expansion of one side’s
nuclear arsenal may drive the two countries unnecessarily to give up nuclear minimalism
and to pursue a spiral[ing arms race].58
This suggests a greater degree of pessimism about stability at low nuclear numbers,
absent controls on other advanced convectional systems—which is probably an accurate
expression of Chinese perceptions, and not merely propaganda to avoid engaging in
negotiations with the United States (and Russia).
Implications of ‘‘Global’’ Low Numbers for China
China has been living with low numbers for more than thirty years. Given that issues other
than arsenal disparity increasingly drive its concerns in bilateral relations with the United
States, large reductions in US (and Russian) arsenals are not likely to enhance China’s sense
of security. As noted above, those issues that drive Chinese insecurity are not primarily
affected by numbers of nuclear weapons alone; and indeed those other factors mentioned
suggest a degree of instability will remain for Beijing. Arguably, that sense of insecurity
would increase if China had to reduce its arsenal as the ‘‘big two’’ reduced theirs.
Furthermore, there is not a well-developed set of understandings regarding
inadvertent escalation in China.59 Thus, any improvement in ‘‘crisis stability’’ that might
emerge due to lower numbers is not viewed as particularly positive either.
There are a few other areas of Chinese security policy that a future of low numbers
might affect: reliability of US extended deterrence and prospects for a rapid increase in
China’s arsenal.
US extended deterrence commitments to Asian allies and partners, as perceived from
China, are likely to be affected by US moves toward lower numbers. At a general level,
connected Chinese scholars have suggested that steps toward stability at lower numbers
would include removing all forward-deployed nuclear weapons (‘‘withdrawing all nuclear
weapons deployed outside their own territories’’).60 While this would not affect US posture
in the region today, it would remove options for bolstering such commitments in the future.
Beyond that, China’s view is that US security guarantees in Asia—both in general
and with nuclear umbrellas, in particular—have enabled Japanese adventurism over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, as well as elsewhere.61 Still, the US-South Korea alliance is rarely
highlighted with regard to nuclear elements.62 Similarly, the US-Taiwan relationship is
even more rarely raised in the nuclear context. However, there are—in both cases—
regular concerns that the US support in general facilitates adventurism or firmer policy.
That said, nuclear umbrellas are not particularly raised in this regard.63
Still, former State Department official Professor Thomas Christensen has persuasively
argued that Chinese policy may become increasingly emboldened on these and related
issues, now that China has achieved a degree of confidence in its survivable second-strike
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force. This may allow a degree of manipulation of threats (lowering nuclear thresholds and
such) to compel others in a crisis.64 Again, given the limitations on acceptable debate within
China, such discussions only occur in the margins of elliptically worded discussions.
Nevertheless, applying Christensen’s finding to a hypothetical future of low numbers
suggests that this confidence should remain high for China in such a future; low numbers on
both sides reduce the prospect for disarming first strikes (relative to the current situation).
That is, China may have been ‘‘deterred’’ in the past in a very general sense.65
Engaging in a conventional crisis that might have a slight prospect of escalation to a
nuclear level, whenever you are heavily disadvantaged, may have led to restraint. If so,
there will be less of such restraint by Beijing in a low numbers world where nuclear use
looks even less likely and both sides have secure second-strike capabilities.
While this may be some cause for concern, there is little in the evidence presented
here to suggest that Beijing might be enticed to ‘‘race to parity’’ if the United States and
Russia draw down their arsenals. Chinese writings consistently lay out rather modest roles
for nuclear weapons. First and foremost, they center on deterring the use of nuclear
weapons or nuclear threats by others. Indeed, the requirements for ‘‘deterrence’’ are often
stated to be quite minimal: ‘‘The experience of China’s nuclear weapons development
makes it clear, in order to deter an opponent’s nuclear attack or threat, guaranteed nuclear
retaliation is not necessary, the possibility of just a certain degree of revenge (first-strike
uncertainty) is enough.’’66 While there are some discussions in internal military documents
of manipulating nuclear threats and thresholds, these, too, do not suggest that a larger
Chinese force would be more able to pursue such a strategy.67 There is no sign of a
developed literature in China that suggests particular advantages of nuclear parity or of
asymmetric advantage in your own nation’s favor.68 Indeed, the opposite seems more the
case: one Chinese author suggests the context of continued US-Russian reductions ‘‘can
make China maintain an attitude of restraint in its nuclear development.’’69 Furthermore,
Chinese posture can remain relaxed in this context: ‘‘At the same time, China does not
need a US-style ‘nuclear warfighting’ capability, does not need to launch preemptive
nuclear strikes, nor keep its nuclear warheads on a hair-trigger alert, and nuclear warheads
do not have to be mated in an loaded condition [to their missiles].’’70
Finally, with regard to Chinese participation in global arms control, the message of
this analysis is generally pessimistic. Even enticing Chinese participation and more
substantively discussing the nature of verification for a global move toward low numbers
is likely to be very challenging. Without including missile defense and some elements of
advanced conventional munitions on such an agenda, there is little prospect that China
would view such talks as constructive. But doing so would risk a tremendous political
backlash in the United States, and constrain US capabilities critically relevant in other,
more competitive, dyads.
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